Collection: Articles
Title: Dynamic moral hazard : a longitudinal examination of automobile insurance in Canada / Peng Shi, Wei Zhang, Jean-Philippe Boucher
Author: Shi, Peng
Notes: Sumario: This article examines moral hazard in the context of dynamic contracting in automobile insurance. Economic theory shows that experience rating of insurers results in state dependence of driving behavior under moral hazard. The empirical analysis is performed using a longitudinal data set from a Canadian automobile insurer. We employ dynamic nonlinear panel data models to distinguish the structural and spurious state dependence, and thus moral hazard and selection on unobservables. As a measure of the riskiness of driving, we consider the frequency, the number, as well as the cost of claims for the policyholder. We find that the state dependence in claim cost reflects both structural and spurious relationships, supporting the moral hazard hypothesis. However, the state dependence in claim occurrence is solely due to unobserved heterogeneity
Related records: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Nueva York : The American Risk and Insurance Association, 1964- = ISSN 0022-4367. - 03/12/2018 Volumen 85 Número 4 - diciembre 2018 , p. 939-958
Materia / geográfico / evento: Seguro de automóviles
Riesgo moral
Contrato de seguro
Accidentes de tráfico
Información asimétrica
Modelos predictivos
Estadísticas
Canadá
Other authors: Zhang, Wei
Boucher, Jean-Philippe
Other categories: 322
Derechos: In Copyright (InC): http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/