Actuarial independence and managerial discretion

Enlace persistente
MARCXML Dublin Core RDF MODS Cita bibliográfica BibTeX SWAP METS
 

Imagen del registro

Artículos Artículos Actuarial independence and managerial discretion - Kamiya, Shinichi

Colección: Artículos

Título: Actuarial independence and managerial discretion / Shinichi Kamiya, Andreas Milidonis

Notas: Sumario: Appointed actuaries are responsible for estimating the largest liability on property-casualty insurance companies' balance sheet. Actuarial independence is crucial in safeguarding accurate estimates, where this independence is self-regulated by actuarial professional institutions. However, professional conflicts of interest arise when appointed actuaries also hold an officer position within the same firm, as officer actuaries also face managerial incentives. Using a sample of U.S. insurers that employ in-house appointed actuaries from 2007 to 2014, we find evidence that officer actuaries have different reserving practices than nonofficer actuaries. This difference in reserving is associated with tax shielding and earnings management incentives. Results are consistent with managerial discretion dominating actuarial independence; they are economically significant and should be of concern to regulators and professional institutions

Autores secundarios: Milidonis, Andreas Icono con lupa

Otras clasificaciones: 213

Ver detalle del número Ver detalle del número