Dynamic moral hazard : a longitudinal examination of...

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Artículos Artículos Dynamic moral hazard : a longitudinal examination of automobile insurance in Canada - Shi, Peng

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Título: Dynamic moral hazard : a longitudinal examination of automobile insurance in Canada / Peng Shi, Wei Zhang, Jean-Philippe Boucher

Autor: Shi, Peng Icono con lupa

Notas: Sumario: This article examines moral hazard in the context of dynamic contracting in automobile insurance. Economic theory shows that experience rating of insurers results in state dependence of driving behavior under moral hazard. The empirical analysis is performed using a longitudinal data set from a Canadian automobile insurer. We employ dynamic nonlinear panel data models to distinguish the structural and spurious state dependence, and thus moral hazard and selection on unobservables. As a measure of the riskiness of driving, we consider the frequency, the number, as well as the cost of claims for the policyholder. We find that the state dependence in claim cost reflects both structural and spurious relationships, supporting the moral hazard hypothesis. However, the state dependence in claim occurrence is solely due to unobserved heterogeneity

Autores secundarios: Zhang, Wei Icono con lupa
Boucher, Jean-Philippe Icono con lupa

Otras clasificaciones: 322

Derechos: In Copyright (InC): http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

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