Dynamic insurance contracts and adverse selection

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Articles Articles Dynamic insurance contracts and adverse selection - Janssen, Maarten C. W.

Collection: Articles

Title: Dynamic insurance contracts and adverse selection / Maarten C. W. Janssen, Vladimir A. Karamychev

Notes: This article take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverse selection and study a dynamic version of the Rothschild and Stiglitz model. Investigate the nature of dynamic insurance contracts by considering both conditional and unconditional dynamic contract. An unconditional dynamic contract has insurance companies offering contract where the terms of the contract depend on time, but not on the occurrence of past accidents

Related records: En: The Journal of risk and insurance. - Orlando. - Volume 72, number 1, March 2005 ; p. 45-59

Other authors: Karamychev, Vladimir A. Icono con lupa

Secondary titles: Título: The Journal of risk and insurance

Other categories: 6

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